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Dementia, transformation, and advance directives

Benjamin C. Lin, David A. Merli
Lehigh Valley Health Network, Allentown, Pennsylvania

The increasing age of the population and
increasingly early detection of conditions that cause
dementia such as Alzheimer’s disease in their
prodromal stage mean that writing advance
directives prior to becoming demented is becoming
more common. In this paper we examine the moral
authority of advanced directives. Advance directives
made by patient can decline medical care for their
future incompetent self. When a demented patient
lacking capacity expresses a desire to make a
healthcare decision that is contrary to that prior
advance directive, the status quo is that the
advanced directive takes precedence. We examine
the authority of advance directives in an important
class of dementia cases: those in which patients’
current best interests appear to conflict with their
past instructions.

Problem Statement
Are there situations in which a demented patient may
overrule their advance directive?

• Nine patients who had dementia secondary to
Normal Pressure Hydrocephalus were identified
and interviewed to generate a qualitative
ethnography.
• These patients had documented dementia, and
had recovered completely or near-completely
after successful placement of a
ventriculoperitoneal shunt.
• Interviews and review of philosophical and
scientific literature on dementia were synthesized
into philosophical arguments.

•

One patient, Dr X, is a retired physician. His dementia caused
him to be lost in familiar areas, unable to make sense of what
he was doing or where he was going. He planned for suicide-an attitude toward which he has mixed feelings now, saying
that his wish “seems very strange now, looking back” but also
saying that he would not want to live if his cognitive dementia
returned, as this would prevent him from engaging in the
activities he loves. (He adds that people of the right
temperament and with good support could live happily with
dementia.)
• The second patient, S, is a retired engineer who describes his
experience of dementia this way:
• “One of the scariest things is - in conversation the sudden...
impact [of realizing] I used to know what those words meant,
and now I don’t. I knew that I had known how to do other
things, and the ability had escaped me...I was working in my
yard, and I was in a flowerbed that was elevated several feet
above the ground, and I had the instant realization that I don’t
know how to get down. Driving one day – where am I? how
did I get here? How do I get back?”
•
Remarkably, after a series of misdiagnoses that S refused to
accept, he managed to find the correct diagnosis himself
through studying medical journals. S now says that he would
not want an advance directive, were he to become demented
again, but would instead prefer to make his own treatment
decisions.
• With all appropriate caveats about limited data, what should
we make of these cases? Two points are salient. First, both Dr
X and S retrospectively described the continuity of their
values before and during dementia: Dr X valued
independence, and time with his horses and dogs; S retained
his commitment to his social relationships. Dr X explicitly
describes himself as having retained his values. S kept his
commitment to social connections and now, as a result of his
experience, volunteers at a hospital and works with patients
who may have NPH. Thus it’s fair to say their values were not
altered by the experience of dementia.
• Second, their attitudes at the time of dementia seem to be
of the appropriate sort to demand respect from the standpoint
of autonomy. Here we want to be agnostic about the precise
nature of attitudes that command this respect, while
suggesting that the attitudes of Dr X and S are clearly in that
category, despite their being sufficiently demented to be
considered incompetent. Both reflectively endorse these
attitudes and want the attitudes to play a particular regulatory
role in their lives-- most vividly seen in Dr X’s commitment
that life without his horses wouldn’t be worth living, and in
S’s preference to avoid an AD and retain decision-making
authority. They both look back on these commitments as their
values.
• Though we are interested in changes in value via
dementia, we think that the attitudes of the moderately
demented Dr X and S are clearly relevant to the question of
autonomous governance, and we think that assessment should
be independent of the content of their attitudes. That is, it
would be illegitimate-- though all too easy-- to “read in”
competence to these patients because their values are ones we
endorse, and to read in incompetence when the values differ
from our own. To avoid that mistake, and to say that X and S
had attitudes that should be respected, is to say that the valuelike attitudes of post-competent patients deserve the same
respect. Because patients can change their minds while
retaining the capacity to value at this level of competence, we
have the same reason to respect their valuing as well, and that
resists the instructions of the AD.

• Our core claim is that the loss of competence
does not entail the absence of valuing, caring, or
exercise of the will that commands respect in
treatment decisions Interviews with patients who
had been cured of dementia in the via successful
treatment for normal pressure hydrocephalus
reveal that patients retrospectively endorse the
continuity of their values throughout their period
of dementia. In addition, the quality of these
values at the time of dementia seem to be of the
appropriate sort to demand respect from the
standpoint of autonomy.

We offer evidence that demented patients lacking
capacity or competence can retain attitudes and
values that imbue their decisions with some
autonomy, thereby commanding a degree of moral
respect for these decisions. This suggests there are
some situations in which demented patients may
make healthcare decisions contrary to an advance
directive.
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